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Abstract

The experience of simultaneously positive and negative orientations toward a person, goal, task, idea,
and such appears to be quite common in organizations, but it is poorly understood. We develop a
multilevel perspective on ambivalence in organizations that demonstrates how this phenomenon is
integral to certain cognitive and emotional processes and important outcomes. Specifically, we discuss
the organizational triggers of ambivalence and the cognitive and emotional mechanisms through which
ambivalence diffuses between the individual and collective levels of analysis. We offer an integrative
framework of major responses to highly intense ambivalence (avoidance, domination, compromise,
and holism) that is applicable to actors at the individual and collective levels. The positive and negative
outcomes associated with each response, and the conditions under which each is most effective, are
explored. Although ambivalence is uncomfortable for actors, it has the potential to foster growth in the
actor as well as highly adaptive and effective behavior.

Introduction

Consider the popular imagery of the leader in an organization. For some of the many below him
in the hierarchy, he is secure, knowing, decisive, powerful, dynamic, threatening, driving, and
altogether remote, acting in clear or obscure ways to affect the future of the organization he
leads. At eye level, he is more often seen as filled with troubled doubts as he tries to deal with
the ambivalences and contradictions of his status. And if his feet are made of a substance more
solid than clay, it is because on his climb to the top and with the aid of those who help hold him
there, he has learned to still the doubts, to live with the ambivalences, and to cope with the
contradictions of his position. (Merton 1976, p. 73)

As this quotation from Robert Merton suggests, ambivalence appears to be fairly common in
organizational settings. Actors are buffeted by complex and dynamic work environments; play multiple
and, at times, contradictory roles; and confront multifaceted issues, goals, and the like (Wang and Pratt
2008). However, as the quote goes on to suggest, actors are often able to “live with the ambivalence”
and “cope with the contradictions.” The quote thus begs the question, how do actors accomplish this
difficult feat—how do they respond to the vexing mixed feelings and thoughts that characterize
ambivalence and somehow move forward with a clear focus and coherent action?
Research in organizational studies is turning increasingly to this and related questions. Indeed, since
the turn of this century, organizational scholars have linked ambivalence and ambivalent relationships
with organizations to resistance to change (Piderit 2000), the propensity to commit corporate crimes
(Vadera and Pratt 2013), and to an increase in escapist behaviors among service personnel (Pratt and
Doucet 2000). However, during this same period, other research has linked cognitive and/or emotional
ambivalence to better chief executive offier (CEO) decision making (Plambeck and Weber 2009),
heightened creativity (Fong 2006), increased receptivity to alternatives resulting in improved judgment
accuracy (Rees et al. 2013), and stronger organizational commitment (Pratt and Rosa 2003).
Unfortunately, such research remains scattered, with few systematic attempts to either link or
systematize the dizzying number of reactions to ambivalence in organizations.
Specifically, a review of extant research on this topic suggests that we know much more about specific
types of responses (e.g., nonconscious responses; Horney 1945) than the conceptual relationship

between responses. Although we know at a general level that individuals might embrace or deny their
ambivalence (Pratt and Pradies 2011)1—and that specific responses range widely from paralysis to
vacillation to strong and concerted action (see Pratt and Doucet 2000, Weigert and Franks 1989)—we
know relatively little about how to compare these various responses. As such, research may be
overlooking key response types. As we explain in greater detail below, we argue that some types of
responses have received a lot of attention (e.g., avoidance), whereas others have been largely ignored
(e.g., holism). In addition, we know that various types of responses exist, but we know relatively little
about the effectiveness of these responses. We define effectiveness as the degree to which a response
reduces the intensity of ambivalence—given the situation—by dealing with the source directly and/or
the symptoms that result. Finally, efforts to organize various responses to ambivalence have tended to
focus on a single level of analysis—namely, the individual (cf. Pradies and Pratt 2010). In short, the field
is lacking a comprehensive typology for building more systematic research on responses to
ambivalence across levels of analysis in organizational settings.
Prior to building a theoretical framework that provides clarity to such responses, it is important to
grasp where ambivalence comes from—that is, the key triggers of ambivalence in organizations—and
how the experience of ambivalence tends to diffuse across levels of analysis. Organizational research
suggests that ambivalence is experienced and acted upon by both individuals (Fong 2006, Pratt 2000)
and collectives (Peters et al. 2011, Pradies and Pratt 2010, Weick 2004). What might trigger
ambivalence within the individual level, the collective level, or across the levels, and through which
social psychological mechanisms might ambivalence diffuse across levels? Establishing a model linking
the upstream processes that connect triggers of ambivalence to the experience itself at both the
individual and collective levels of analysis will set the stage for examining what actors then do with the
ambivalence experienced.
In sum, our paper seeks to provide an organizing framework of responses to ambivalence: a framework
that is applicable to both the individual and collective levels of analysis and that clarifies the conditions
under which each response is relatively more effective. To build a foundation for these issues, we first
discuss what ambivalence is. We then discuss the organizational triggers of ambivalence and how
ambivalence at one level of analysis may diffuse to the other level. We then provide an in-depth
exploration of individual and collective responses to ambivalence. The result is an integrative multilevel
framework of ambivalence in organizations that indicates how this phenomenon is central to certain
cognitive/emotional processes and important outcomes. We specifically suggest that avoidance,
domination, compromise, and holism are the major, more or less distinct, responses to ambivalence.
We also discuss the conditions under which each response is most effective and the positive and
negative outcomes of each response. We conclude by exploring implications for future research.

What Is Ambivalence?

Ambivalence literally refers to the experience of two (ambi) opposing forces (valences) and is derived
from the Latin ambo, or “both,” and valere, which means “to be strong” (Meyerson and Scully 1995).
Although there have been some differences in how ambivalence has been defined (see Conner and
Sparks 2002 for a review), there remains a high degree of convergence across definitions in
psychological research. Specifically, we define ambivalence as simultaneously positive and negative
orientations toward an object. “Orientation” refers to the actor’s alignment or position with regard to

the object, where a positive orientation means attraction or a pull toward it and a negative orientation
means repulsion or a push away from it. Ambivalence includes cognition (“I think about X”) and/or
emotion (“I feel about X”); ambivalence occurs when cognitions clash, emotions clash, or cognitions
and emotions clash. Thus, ambivalence is often described as having “mixed feelings,” being “torn
between conflicting impulses,” and being “pulled in different directions.”
Four important points regarding our definition of ambivalence should be clarified. First, following
research on the psychodynamic roots of ambivalence (Freud 1950/1920, Horney 1945, Sincoff 1990),
individuals may not be conscious of their ambivalence. However, even if nonconscious, ambivalence
may nonetheless affect individuals (cf. Meyerson and Scully 1995). Second, we follow the lead of
others (e.g., Horney 1945) and focus on substantive (or, as we describe later, high intensity) rather
than superficial (low intensity) ambivalence, as the latter (1) is likely to be ignored, (2) has little impact
on behavior, and by extension (3) is of relatively little concern to management. Third, although some
conceptualizations of ambivalence also include a behavioral component, we focus exclusively on
ambivalence as a cognitive-emotional construct.2 Ambivalence, as it was originally coined by Bleuler in
the early 1900s, focused only on cognition and emotion (Sincoff 1990). In addition, abundant research
on the attitude–behavior relationship (see Sheeran 2002 for a review) indicates that various factors
may dampen the link between the two, such as situational constraints and impression management
concerns. Thus, we regard behavioral tendencies and behavior itself as probabilistic outcomes of
ambivalence rather than as part of its definition. Finally, with some notable exceptions, the literature
tends to view ambivalence as more or less dysfunctional for individuals (e.g., Bowlby 1982, Horney
1945, Merton 1976). However, we will argue that ambivalence can be functional, dysfunctional, or
perhaps—not ironically—both.
Table 1 contrasts our definition of ambivalence with definitions of related constructs in the
organizational literature—cognitive dissonance, emotional dissonance, hypocrisy, ambiguity, and
equivocality. As the table suggests, the seminal differences between ambivalence and these other
constructs are that ambivalence involves an individual’s oppositional orientations toward an object
rather than mere uncertainty or inconsistency, and it involves cognition and/or emotion but not
behavior.
Table 1 Construct Definitions and Relationships to Ambivalence at the Individual Level
Construct
Ambivalence
Cognitive
dissonance

Emotional
dissonance

Definition
Simultaneously oppositional positive and negative orientations toward an object.
Ambivalence includes cognition (“I think about X”) and/or emotion (“I feel about X”).
“When a person has two beliefs or items of knowledge that are not consistent with each
other” (Kantola et al. 1984, p. 417). There is conceptual overlap between dissonance and
ambivalence (Baek 2010), but this definition suggests that dissonance arises when there is
inconsistency between thoughts (e.g., I want to hire candidate A, but I also want to hire
candidate B), whereas ambivalence requires opposite orientations, which is a more extreme
contrast than inconsistency, toward a single object (e.g., I want to hire candidate A and I
want to not hire candidate A). Additionally, cognitive dissonance is exclusively cognitive,
whereas ambivalence can be cognitive and/or affective.
“The discrepancy between emotions felt and those required by the job role is commonly
referred to as emotional dissonance” (Diestel and Schmidt 2011, p. 643). As with the
distinction above regarding cognitive dissonance, ambivalence requires opposition and not

Hypocrisy

Ambiguity

Equivocality

simply discrepancy. Thus, a role may require one to smile when one does not feel like it
(emotional dissonance), but this is different than simultaneously feeling happy and not
happy (ambivalence). Moreover, the inconsistency in emotional dissonance is between a
feeling and a behavior that one’s role demands. Ambivalence is not necessarily emotional
and does not include a behavior.
“Clear inconsistency between word and deed” (Fassin and Buelens 2011, p. 587). Hypocrisy
is a contradiction between a statement and action, which is generally perceived and labeled
by an observer. Ambivalence involves cognition and/or emotion rather than behavior,
although ambivalence may cause an actor to behave in ways that could be perceived by
others as hypocritical. Thus, hypocrisy can be an outcome of ambivalence.
“The degree of uncertainty inherent in perceptions of the environmental state” (Carson et
al. 2006, p. 1059). Ambiguity is concerned with uncertainty or a lack of clarity, whereas
ambivalence is the experience of two clear but opposing thoughts and/or feelings toward an
object.
“The multiplicity of meaning conveyed by information about organizational activities” (Daft
and Macintosh 1981, p. 211). Equivocality captures the potential for multiple meanings and
interpretations of a message. If these meanings are oppositional, there is potential for the
equivocality to trigger ambivalence.

Collective Ambivalence

Researchers such as Smith and Berg (1987), Weick (2004), Pradies and Pratt (2010), and Peters et al.
(2011) have suggested the existence of ambivalence in collectives. For example, in referring to a
network of medical specialists working to identify the West Nile Virus, Weick (2002, p. s13, emphasis
added) notes that “[a]mbivalence can be a property of networks and distributed cognition, as well as a
property of individuals.” However, beyond indicating the possibility that collective ambivalence can
exist, little work has been done to formally define and differentiate collective-level ambivalence
(cf. Pradies and Pratt 2010).3
Ambivalence at the collective level aligns with our definition presented earlier: simultaneously positive
and negative orientations toward an object, whereby ambivalence includes cognition (“we think
about X”) and/or emotion (“we feel about X”) experienced by a collective. Also, just as ambivalence at
the individual level can be said to be more or less intense and more or less conscious, so too can
ambivalence at the collective level. Finally, mirroring what we did at the individual level, Table
2 contrasts this definition with related constructs at the collective level—namely, duality, paradox,
organizational hypocrisy, dialectics, and organizational ambidexterity. The major differences are that
duality, paradox, and organizational hypocrisy refer to external conditions that when internalized by a
collective may give rise to ambivalence, and that dialectics and organizational ambidexterity refer to
means of managing tensions rather than to the actual experience of ambivalence.
Table 2 Construct Definitions and Relationships to Ambivalence at the Collective Level
Construct
Ambivalence
Duality

Definition
Simultaneously oppositional positive and negative orientations toward an object.
Ambivalence includes cognition (“we think about X”) and/or emotion (“we feel about X”).
“The twofold character of an object of study without separation…it retains the idea of
two essential elements, but it views them as interdependent [complementary and
contradictory], rather than separate and opposed” (Farjoun 2010, p. 203). Whereas
ambivalence is internal to the actor, a duality exists external to the actor perceiving the

Paradox

Organizational
hypocrisy

Dialectics

Organizational
ambidexterity

duality. A duality may trigger ambivalence if the two essential elements produce opposite
orientations.
“ ‘Paradox’ denotes contradictory yet interrelated elements—elements that seem logical
in isolation but absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously” (Lewis 2000, p.
760). Paradox refers to situations that are external to actors. A paradox may trigger
ambivalence if the contradictory elements foster opposite orientations to a particular
object.
Brunsson (1993) refers to organizational hypocrisy to describe occasions when an
organization acts in contradiction to what it says. As with sociological ambivalence more
generally, such a hypocritical “event” may trigger collective-level ambivalence if it is
experienced by multiple members of the organization. However, organizational hypocrisy
in and of itself does not denote how such hypocrisy is experienced—either as a univalent
response (e.g., disillusionment, disgust) or an ambivalent response.
Tracy (2004) explains how dialectics is a tension management technique that enables
organizational actors to not view tensions as tensions per se but, via reframing, as
complementary. However, dialectics is more about managing tensions or even
contradictions than the experience of these tensions. As such, dialectics is more akin to
the response we labeled “holism” than to ambivalence.
“[F]irms are ambidextrous—aligned and efficient in their management of today’s business
demands while simultaneously adaptive to changes in the environment…. To be
ambidextrous, organizations have to reconcile internal tensions and conflicting demands
in their task environments” (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, p. 375). As with dialectics,
organizational ambidexterity focuses on organizational actions to manage tension and
conflicting demands, rather than the experience of ambivalence.

Organizational Triggers and the Diffusion of Ambivalence

What situational factors cue ambivalence at the individual and collective levels of analysis, and how
does ambivalence experienced at the individual level spread to the collective level, and vice
versa? Figure 1 summarizes the arguments to follow. The multilevel dynamism of the figure is modeled
after the approach of Kozlowski et al. (2009) to organizational learning across multiple levels of
analysis, along with research on specific social-psychological mechanisms through which cognition and
emotion may spread in organizations.

Figure 1 Organizational Ambivalence Across Levels

Organizational Triggers of Ambivalence

Sociologists have tended to view norms and roles as sources of ambivalence, whereas psychologists
have tended to view individual differences and relationships as sources (Wang and Pratt 2008).
Although psychological sources of ambivalence are relatively well understood, the contextual sources
of ambivalence, particularly in organizations, “have often been elusive or highly contingent” (Plambeck
and Weber 2010, p. 705). Given our interest in understanding how individuals and collectives respond
to ambivalence, we focus on the most common potential organizational triggers of ambivalence. Each
of the four major types of triggers discussed below can operate at the collective or individual level of
analysis, as our examples will illustrate. It should be noted that these triggers, like any situational
factor, are a matter of perception and are more or less amenable to framing by organizational leaders
(Smircich and Morgan 1982).
The major contextual roots of ambivalence appear to be complexity and dynamism in the environment
and the organization itself (cf. Weigert and Franks 1989). Organizations typically face complex and
dynamic environments, where the meaning of events is ambiguous or equivocal, the future is
fundamentally uncertain, and the numerous and often conflicting demands of diverse stakeholders
must be addressed. Such environments frequently foster the more proximal contextual root
of oppositions, where a demand for A is juxtaposed with a demand for “not-A.”
Oppositions appear to manifest in four major ways: (1) hybrid identities, contradictory goals, and role
conflicts; (2) dualities; (3) multifaceted objects; and (4) temporal factors.
Hybrid Identities, Contradictory Goals, and Role Conflicts
According to Merton and Barber (1976, p. 6), “[I]ncompatible normative expectations of attitudes,
beliefs, and behaviors” are the essence of sociological ambivalence. Specifically, such oppositions may
manifest in hybrid identities, contradictory goals, and role conflicts (Adler 2012, Albert and Whetten
1985, Brunsson 1989, Katz and Kahn 1978, Pratt and Foreman 2000). To illustrate, at the collective
level, Glynn (2000) shows how the Atlantic Symphony Orchestra played out its competing “artistry”
and “utility” identities during a musicians’ strike—with the former identity focusing on normative
claims of excellent music and the latter focusing on economic concerns for profit. At the individual
level, Fong and Tiedens (2002) note the emotional ambivalence experienced by women in high-status
positions. On one hand, attainment of professional goals produces positive affect; on the other hand,
pressure to conform to gender stereotypes (that contradict normative behaviors in high-power roles)
produces negative affect.
Organizational Dualities
Oppositional tendencies often manifest in the form of organizational dualities and related concepts
such as paradoxes, dilemmas, double binds, oxymorons, and ironies (Clegg 2002, Hatch 1997, Smith
and Lewis 2011, Tracy 2004). Dualities are particularly likely to provoke ambivalence because of their
simultaneous injunction to do A and to do the opposite of A. Well-documented examples, particularly
at the collective level, include continuity versus change, a global versus local focus, and competition
versus cooperation. Although ostensibly opposites on a continuum, where more of one necessarily
means less of the other, a dualities perspective views them as facets of a natural wholeness (Graetz
and Smith 2008). That is, the dualistic facets are complementary even though each—as noted in Table
2 regarding paradox—may “seem logical in isolation but absurd and irrational when appearing

simultaneously” (Lewis 2000, p. 760). However, dualities and related concepts may nonetheless trigger
ambivalence toward a given action by fostering seemingly oppositional imperatives (e.g., competition
versus cooperation).
Perhaps the most common dualities faced by individuals involve memberships in various collectives,
including the organization itself. Smith and Berg (1987) describe 12 membership dualities under the
labels of “paradoxes of belonging” (e.g., maintaining individuality and maintaining commonality within
a group), “paradoxes of engaging” (e.g., incorporating past experiences while breaking with past
experiences), and “paradoxes of speaking” (e.g., accepting dependence on group members in order to
act independently). Accordingly, even the most effective collectives are laced with many, at least tacit,
dualities for the individual. Moreover, the more strongly that one dualistic quality is emphasized, the
greater the countervailing need for the other (Erikson 1976, Smelser 1998). For instance, following
Smith and Berg, a strong effort to identify with a group may spawn a counter-desire to establish one’s
individuality.
Multifaceted Objects
Oppositions often manifest in multifaceted objects, such as policies and cultures at the collective level
and jobs and relationships at the individual level (Merton 1976, Pratt 2001). Although an individual’s or
collective’s stance toward particularly salient facets may exert a positive or negative “halo”
(e.g., Feeley 2002) over other facets, it remains that the individual or collective is unlikely to have a
common stance toward every facet, partly because positive and negative aspects tend to surface over
time (Wilson and Hodges 1992). Specifically, the more familiar an actor is with an object, the richer the
store of information and the greater the probability of having encountered the object’s multiple facets
and imperfections. In short, as Brooks and Highhouse (2006, p. 105) put it, “Familiarity breeds
ambivalence.” For example, research on personal relationships indicates that ambivalence typically
characterizes even the most intimate of bonds; indeed, Thompson and Holmes (1996, p. 502) conclude
that “a moderate level of ambivalence may actually indicate a balanced, realistic assessment of a
partner.” Moving to organizational contexts, Oglensky (2008) concludes that even robust mentor–
protégé relationships are inherently ambivalent, and Kreiner and Ashforth’s (2004, p. 20) study
suggested that ambivalent identification with the organization was “not a rare existential experience”
among employees (see also Brief 1998, Ziegler et al. 2012).
Temporal Factors
Finally, oppositional tendencies are often introduced by various temporal factors (Hillcoat-Nallétamby
and Phillips 2011, Pratt and Doucet 2000). As noted, organizational contexts are typically dynamic;
indeed, Lewin (1951) argues that seemingly stable states are really temporary equilibria held in place
by opposing forces. Dynamism may introduce change, inconsistencies, ambiguities, and lags in objects
at the individual and collective levels of analysis such that, similar to multifaceted objects, they
generate oppositions. An otherwise supportive manager may act in a surprisingly unsupportive
manner, and an organization that strongly espouses integrity may succumb to temptation and act in a
highly unethical way. Furthermore, the use of developmental feedback at the individual level and
continuous improvement at the collective level necessitates that even under conditions of success,
actors need to acknowledge both the pros and cons (e.g., “The project was a success, but we can do
better next time”). And research on counterfactual thinking indicates that reflecting on “what could

have been” (Roese 1997, as cited in Fong 2006, p. 1017) may introduce, for individuals and collectives
alike, an oppositional stance into otherwise positive events (“it could have been better”) and negative
events (“it could have been worse”). For example, Olympic silver medalists were found to
be less happy with their achievement than bronze medalists because they “just missed the gold”
(Medvec et al. 1995).
It is evident, then, that the complexity and dynamism of organizational life engender a number of
potential oppositions. Moreover, as indicated by the bidirectional arrow 1 in Figure 1, oppositions at
one level of analysis may affect oppositions at the other. For example, prisons are charged with the
somewhat oppositional goals of rehabilitating inmates and punishing inmates, which have “trickled
down” (Tracy 2004, p. 124) to foster role conflict among individual correctional officers (e.g., “respect
versus suspect”). Conversely, the individual-level paradoxes of belonging noted above (e.g.,
maintaining individuality, maintaining commonality within a group) may foster a collective that is riven
with oppositions (e.g., we are one versus we are many; see Smith and Berg 1987).
Because these oppositions are so commonplace in organizations, we suspect that ambivalence is a very
common experience in organizations. Not surprisingly, as indicated by arrows 2 and 3 in Figure 1,
oppositions at the collective or individual level of analysis tend to trigger the experience of
ambivalence at the same level. For instance, Das and Teng (2000) report that strategic alliances involve
certain dialectical tensions (e.g., cooperation versus competition, rigidity versus flexibility, short-term
versus long-term orientation), which are likely to provoke ambivalence among top management teams
(e.g., we should cooperate and not cooperate). And Ashforth et al. (2013) find that role conflict
experienced by telemarketers is associated with ambivalence toward their occupation. Furthermore,
following the theorizing of Kozlowski et al. (2009), cross-level effects from collective triggers to
individuals’ experience of ambivalence are likely common (see arrow 4 in Figure 1). For
instance, Piderit (2000) argues that the most prevalent reaction to organizational change—a temporal
factor in our model—is employee ambivalence, as individuals simultaneously support and resist change
efforts. Conversely, cross-level effects from individual-level triggers to collective ambivalence are likely
to be more indirect. We argue in the following section that such cross-level effects are largely
mediated by collective sensemaking and emotional processes (hence, we do not depict a cross-level
arrow in Figure 1 from individual triggers to collective ambivalence).

Diffusion of Ambivalence

Whereas the previous section established the organizational triggers of ambivalence and their role in
fostering individual and collective ambivalence (arrows 1–4 in Figure 1), this section focuses on the
social-psychological mechanisms through which ambivalence at the individual level may spread to the
collective level (i.e., bottom-up emergent effects; arrow 5) and ambivalence at the collective level may
spread to the individual level (i.e., top-down cascade effects; also arrow 5). The upshot is a recursive
loop where expressed ambivalence is likely to have a “ripple effect” (Barsade 2002, p. 644) such that “I
think/feel” becomes “we think/feel,” and vice versa.
Bottom-Up Emergent Effects
Morgeson and Hofmann (1999, p. 257) note that “the investigation of constructs at the collective level
could begin with an understanding of the interaction of organizational members.” To that
end, Kozlowski and Klein (2000, p. 55) observe that “[a] phenomenon is emergent when it originates in

the cognition, affect, behaviors, or other characteristics of individuals, is amplified by their interactions,
and manifests as a higher-level, collective phenomenon.” Research on collective-level cognitions and
emotions provides examples of collective cognitive phenomena such as team mental models (Klimoski
and Mohammed 1994, Lim and Klein 2006), collective interpretations (Isabella 1990), and
intersubjectivity (Ashforth et al. 2011, Wiley 1988) and collective emotional phenomena such as group
affective tone (George 1996), emotional culture (Ashforth and Saks 2002), and group emotion (Barsade
and Gibson 1998). These collective-level constructs are instructive for understanding the collectivelevel nature of ambivalence and provide several pathways whereby ambivalence may emerge via
individual interactions (Pradies and Pratt 2010).
The sensemaking perspective (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991, Maitlis 2005, Weick 1995, Weick et al. 2005)
is a useful mechanism for articulating the cognitive nature of the vertical links between individual and
collective experiences of ambivalence (arrow 5 in the upward direction in Figure 1). According
to Stigliani and Ravasi’s (2012, p. 1241) process model of collective sensemaking, individual
sensemaking and cognitions become shared by the collective through “the interplay between
conversational and material practices.” Stigliani and Ravasi found that design consultants alternated
between working on their own and holding group meetings where they shared their ideas. Specifically,
individuals noticed and bracketed information on their own, they articulated it to the group, and the
group elaborated on it through explicit conversations (e.g., “storybuilding”), cognitive subprocesses
(e.g., “building on each other’s ideas”), and material artifacts (e.g., “sketches”), which resulted in
shared cognition among the collective. As an illustration regarding ambivalence, Gutierrez et al. (2010,
p. 673) describe how revelations that the Catholic Church had covered up the sexual abuse of minors
by priests fostered ambivalence toward the church among some individuals: “A few dozen grieving
laity began gathering to discuss their reactions in a suburban church basement. Within five months,
the group grew into a 20,000-member organization” called Voice of the Faithful; its motto is “Keep the
faith, change the church.”
Regarding the emotional processes through which ambivalence may emerge from the individual level
(arrow 5 in the upward direction in Figure 1), one major pathway is via emotional contagion, defined as
“a process in which a person or group influences the emotions or behavior of another person or group
through the conscious or unconscious induction of emotion states and behavioral attitudes”
(Schoenewolf 1990, as cited in Barsade 2002, p. 646). With contagion, emotions can spread to a
collective via nonconscious and conscious interactions such as synchronization (Neumann and Strack
2000) and the social sharing of emotions (Peters and Kashima 2007). A second major pathway is
suggested by Van Kleef’s (2008) emotions-as-social-information model, where emotional cues are
“read” more indirectly via cognitive processing (“why does she feel that way?”). Similarly, individuals
may engage in “emotional comparison” (Ashforth and Saks 2002, p. 350) with others to assess the
meaning and appropriateness of their own arousal (“why do I feel this way?”; see, e.g., Bartel and
Saavedra 2000). Rothman and Wiesenfeld (2007) confirm that ambivalent emotions can be read by
others and thus may be suitable for contagion and social information effects.
The upshot of collective sensemaking and the above emotional conduits is that individual ambivalence
may foster collective ambivalence (arrow 5 in the upward direction in Figure 1). In the multilevel
terminology of Kozlowski and Klein (2000, p. 16), these “forms of emergence” result in “composition”

effects, that is, a convergence in the perspectives/experiences of individuals and the collective such
that the ambivalence becomes shared.4
Top-Down Cascade Effects
In organizations, collective ambivalence is likely to spread from the collective to individuals, and
particularly from leaders to followers, through both cognitive and emotional mechanisms. Because
senior managers act on behalf of subunits and organizations, their experience of ambivalence
implicates entire collectives (cf. Staw and Sutton 1993). Sensegiving enables managers to shape the
way that individuals interpret and think about the context, which is perhaps the most important role
that leaders play in times of change (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991, Maitlis and Lawrence 2007).
Sensegiving is generally thought to be a deliberate and even strategic process of communicating
meaning downward (e.g., framing, decoupling; see Fiss and Zajac 2006). There are two mechanisms
through which managers may sow ambivalence downward: intentional and unintentional. First,
following the notion of “strategic ambiguity,” managers may intentionally convey mixed or at least
equivocal messages as a means of stimulating change by implicitly challenging the status quo in a
relatively nonthreatening manner (Eisenberg 1984, Gioia et al. 2012). This literature argues that
equivocality enables actors to perceive “the” message they personally favor, thereby producing
ideographic rather than holographic ambivalence across actors with different preferences (see
endnote 3 and, e.g., Sonenshein 2010). However, we will argue later in our discussion section that
managers might intentionally sow ambivalence to provoke actors into thinking more dialectically and
acting more wisely. Second, managers may sow ambivalence by unintentionally conveying mixed or at
least equivocal messages. Even where managers attempt to buffer followers from the managers’ own
experience of ambivalence by delivering clear and unequivocal messages (Smircich and Morgan
1982, Smith et al. 2010), managers’ ambivalence may nonetheless “leak out” through various verbal
and/or nonverbal cues. For instance, Larson and Tompkins (2005) found that senior managers of an
aerospace company sent mixed messages about the desirability of a shift in corporate values from
technical excellence to efficiency. Specifically, the managers continued to reward employees for
technical excellence while propounding the overriding need for efficiency (at the expense of technical
excellence), thereby sowing their ambivalence throughout the company and implicitly encouraging
employee resistance to change.
Collectives and, again, particularly leaders, may also spread ambivalence through emotional processes.
Research clearly indicates that, whether intentionally or not, leaders serve to “model emotions”
(Pescosolido 2002, p. 593), such that their expressed affect influences the affective experience of
followers (e.g., Ashakanasy [sic] and Humphrey 2011, Erez et al. 2008). As with bottom-up emergence,
the modeling may occur directly via emotional contagion or more indirectly through social information
processing and comparison of emotional cues. In the above example of the aerospace company, Larson
and Tompkins (2005, p. 13) note how management’s expressions of “collective pride” in the company’s
technical excellence helped fuel employees’ ambivalence regarding the change from technical
excellence to efficiency.
In sum, as arrows 1–5 in Figure 1 indicate, there are four major organizational triggers of ambivalence
affecting both the individual and collective levels of analysis. In turn, the individual’s experience of
ambivalence may spread to the collective level via sensemaking and emotional processes (arrow 5 in

the upward direction), and the collective’s experience of ambivalence may spread to the individual
level via sensegiving and emotional processes (arrow 5 in the downward direction). Accordingly, the
experience of ambivalence at one level is likely to be positively correlated with the experience of
ambivalence at the other level.

How Do Individuals and Collectives Respond to Ambivalence?

Consistency theories such as cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) and balance theory (Heider
1958) indicate that ambivalence tends to be aversive—that is, that the sense of being simultaneously
attracted to and repulsed by an object is typically discomforting. Thus, Harrist (2006) finds the
experience of ambivalence to be characterized by “disorientation,” described as a sense of
disequilibrium, confusion, apprehension, and loss of control, where it feels wrong to have more than
one orientation toward an object.
We define a response as a conscious or nonconscious effort to reduce the intensity of ambivalence
experienced, whether through addressing the underlying causes or the symptoms. A given response
may involve cognition, affect, and/or behavior. Although our model of responses can be applied to
cases of low- or high-intensity ambivalence, our discussion—as noted—focuses on the latter precisely
because they are more problematic for the actor. Intensity refers to the extent to which the actor
experiences opposing orientations as strong. Intensity is associated with issues that matter to the
actor. The more intense ambivalence becomes, the more the actor will be motivated to take action to
reduce the discomfort.
Generally speaking, intense ambivalence is salient to the actor, where salience is the extent to which
the actor is consciously aware of the opposing orientations. Intensity tends to trigger salience (the
discomfort provokes awareness), and to a lesser extent, salience may reinforce intensity (awareness of
a contradiction is itself disturbing). Most ambivalence research in psychology—and the goal in lab
studies—focuses on at least moderately intense and highly salient ambivalence. However, it is possible
to experience ambivalence that is intense yet not be aware of it. This is the primary focus of Freudian
theories of defense mechanisms, where actors struggle nonconsciously to keep intense but socially
undesirable thoughts and feelings from breaking into consciousness (Baumeister et al. 1998, Cramer
2006).

A Framework of Responses to Ambivalence

Research in psychology and, to a lesser extent, sociology offers many responses to ambivalence
(e.g., Coser 1966, Horney 1945, Katz and Glass 1979, Tracy 2004; see Pratt and Doucet 2000 for a
review). However, what is sorely lacking is a clear conceptual framework for organizing these disparate
responses to ambivalence and applying them systematically to organizational contexts. Such a
framework will clarify how various responses are (or are not) related and will identify gaps in what has
been studied and, accordingly, opportunities for future research. In this section, we offer an integrative
framework to explain when and why certain responses are most likely to occur in organizations
(see Figure 2). Prior work that was most instrumental to our framework includes Horney’s (1945) very
basic typology of moving toward/away from/against the object of ambivalence (see also Pratt and
Doucet 2000) and research on interpersonal conflict-handling styles (Blake and Mouton 1964, Rahim
1985, Thomas 1992).

Figure 2 Actor Responses to Ambivalence

Figure 2 decomposes the response to ambivalence into a focus on the positive orientation (i.e.,
attraction) toward the object and a focus on the negative (i.e., repulsion) orientation, as reflected by
the two axes. The axes are partitioned into “low” and “high” for pedagogical purposes, suggesting four
more or less distinct responses to ambivalence. First, avoidance, similar to “moving away,” involves a
low focus—that is, little emphasis—on each orientation. Second, compromise involves a moderate
focus on each orientation. Third, domination, similar to “moving toward” and “moving against,”
involves a high focus—that is, much emphasis—on one orientation and a low focus on the other; thus
domination appears twice in the figure. Fourth, holism involves a high focus on each.
Not surprisingly, collective-level ambivalence tends to motivate collective responses and individuallevel ambivalence tends to motivate individual responses (see arrows 6 and 7 in Figure 1). That is,
responses are generally more likely to arise at the level where the ambivalence occurs, and such
responses are generally more effective because they address the commensurate triggers. However,
collective ambivalence may also motivate the cross-level effect of individual responses (arrow 8
in Figure 1) if (1) collective responses are absent or ineffective, or (2) individuals prefer an idiosyncratic
approach (e.g., engaging in avoidance while one’s peers engage in holism). Conversely, individual
ambivalence on its own is unlikely to motivate a collective response precisely because the ambivalence
is confined to the individual level. As noted, collective responses will be most likely to occur if
individual ambivalence becomes diffused to the collective level. Finally, collective and individual
responses likely interact as collective responses provide a context for any subsequent individual
responses (e.g., an individual experiencing residual ambivalence may enact an additional response),
and individual responses to collective ambivalence may facilitate, through social learning processes
(Bandura 1977), a more collective response (bidirectional arrow 9 in Figure 1).
Each of the four responses—avoidance, dominance, compromise, and holism—is considered below. It
should be noted that the authors of the studies we cite did not use our terminology; we are inferring
the existence of specific responses, as well as, at times, ambivalence itself, from the descriptions the
authors provide. Our treatment of holism will be more detailed because it is less well understood and

more complex. We consider the nature of each response to ambivalence and likely positive and
negative outcomes for the individual and collective experiencing ambivalence. Additionally, we
consider how other actors may view any behaviors that accompany the response. At first blush, it
would appear that holism is the optimal response as it seems to signify a “win–win” approach in the
sense that both orientations become fully integrated. However, in addition to arguing that there are
both positive and negative outcomes associated with each response, we argue that each response is
more effective under certain circumstances (cf. Rahim 1985). Furthermore, because conscious and
nonconscious processes tend to be intertwined, it should be noted that the responses may be enacted
consciously, nonconsciously, or both.
To embed the discussion in organizational contexts, we focus on cases where the ambivalence is
attributable to the organizational triggers discussed earlier. We assume that the triggers lack a ready
pragmatic solution or that the actor opts out of such a solution (e.g., quits the job). Given the triggers,
many issues are inherently difficult to resolve (e.g., awareness of an object’s multiple facets). We also
assume, in view of the proximal contextual root of opposition that underlies the triggers discussed
above and based on our reading of diverse examples of ambivalence in organizations, that a given
trigger is amenable to a variety of responses. That is, specific triggers (e.g., dualities, multifaceted jobs)
do not necessitate specific responses. That said, we will return to these assumptions in our discussion
section.

Avoidance
Nature of the Response
If intense ambivalence is by definition strong, how is it possible that an individual or collective can
maintain a low focus on both the positive and negative orientations to the object? The answer, we
contend, is through the use of defense mechanisms and coping mechanisms. Following Cramer (1998,
p. 920; 2006), defense and coping mechanisms are means by which actors protect themselves from the
“emotional consequences of adversity.” Defense mechanisms are nonconscious (in terms of awareness
and effort) and unintentional, whereas coping mechanisms are conscious and intentional.5 Coping
mechanisms focus on resolving the problem (what Lazarus and Folkman 1984 refer to as “problemfocused coping”) and/or alleviating tension (“emotion-focused coping”). Because defense mechanisms
and the emotion-focused coping mechanisms utilized in this cell of Figure 2 enable the actor to avoid
directly dealing with the ambivalence and perhaps even acknowledging it, this cell is labeled
“avoidance.” As such, avoidance is typically reactive rather than proactive.
Perhaps the most commonly used avoidance defense mechanisms for warding off ambivalence are
denial and splitting. Denial protects the actor from threat by actively but nonconsciously rejecting,
reinterpreting, forgetting, or minimizing disagreeable information (Baumeister et al. 1998, Sincoff
1992). Argyris (1990, p. 30) asserts that most organizational cultures actually facilitate and reward
defensiveness because norms favor care for people within the organization over facing tough issues
that could upset or offend them, such that “defense routines are protected and reinforced by the very
people who prefer that they do not exist.” In splitting, the actor nonconsciously separates the positive
and negative orientations so that opposition is not perceived. For example, Rowe et al. (2005) note
that poor team performance may induce sports teams and their fans to be ambivalent about the team
(“I love my team but I hate them for doing so poorly”). This ambivalence is often avoided by splitting

the admired qualities of the team from the poor performance and attributing the latter to other
causes, often the coach (cf. scapegoating; see Wexler 1993). The Boston Red Sox collapse at the end of
the 2011 season, and the subsequent dismantling of the general management team, provides a good
illustration of such dynamics (Brown 2011).
Perhaps the most commonly used coping mechanisms in organizations for shielding the actor against
the discomfort associated with marked ambivalence are suppression, escape or distraction, and
emotional release. Because these mechanisms are commonly associated with all manner of stressors,
our discussion will be brief. Suppression involves a conscious effort to dismiss anxiety-provoking
thoughts about the issue in question. A manager facing ambivalence about his work role because of
work–home conflicts (be at work versus be at home) may willfully disattend to the conflicts. Escape or
distraction involves diverting one’s attention from the problematic issue. Finally, emotional release
involves venting the aversive feelings arising from ambivalence. For example, Rosen (1988) describes
how the members of an advertising agency vented the negative emotions associated with their
ambivalence toward the firm by performing skits at the firm’s Christmas party; the skits lampooned
senior management and the firm.
Positive and Negative Outcomes
Avoidance may appear to be a dysfunctional response to ambivalence in organizations. Because
avoidance reduces the immediate tension associated with ambivalence, it may prevent the actor from
even recognizing the ambivalence, thereby inhibiting learning and problem solving (Argyris 1993). Also,
avoidance may prove futile in any event because unwelcome thoughts are not easily denied or
suppressed (Wegner 1989), and focusing on unwelcome emotions through emotional release may only
render them more salient (e.g., Brown et al. 2005). Thus, the defense mechanisms of denial and
splitting have been labeled “immature” defenses (e.g., Andrews et al. 1993, p. 252), and emotionfocused coping mechanisms have been found to predominate when an actor believes that a stressor
must be endured rather than constructively managed (Folkman and Lazarus 1980).
However, there appears to be a functional side to avoidance in organizations. Although avoidance does
not address the root cause of the ambivalence, it may nonetheless be effective under two conditions.
The first is where the actor has low discretion or agency and thus cannot forge a more integrative
response, if warranted, as in compromise and holism. The second condition is where immediate action
is not required or the opposing orientations are not actively in conflict. Keeping tensions at bay
through avoidance may be all that is truly needed. For example, nurses who smoked were ambivalent
about their responsibility for advising patients against smoking. When a patient’s need for such advice
appeared low (e.g., the malady was unrelated to smoking), some nurses tended to avoid advising
patients against smoking (Radsma and Bottorff 2009). Defense and coping mechanisms help reduce
tension to a more tolerable level, enabling an actor to persevere more effectively. Indeed, it appears
that most actors continue to perform effectively even though ambivalence is more the norm than the
exception in various domains of life, presumably including organizations (Smelser 1998). Furthermore,
defense and coping mechanisms may facilitate subsequent compromise and holism by reducing
debilitating tension while preserving the ambivalent qualities. For instance, Schneider (2003, p.
33) argues that splitting, by preventing “premature closure,” creates a “generative space” where actors
have an opportunity to confront and work through the tension.

Finally, because avoidance is largely signified by the absence of overt behaviors, other actors who are
unaware of the issue prompting the ambivalence will have little reason to make attributions about the
focal actor. When other actors are aware of the issue and regard it as important, avoidance—as the
absence of action in the face of threat—is likely to prompt negative attributions (e.g., “that group is in
denial”).

Domination
Nature of the Response
Domination is a defense mechanism (i.e., a nonconscious process) and/or coping mechanism (i.e., a
conscious process) through which actors bolster one orientation so that it overwhelms the other.
Domination is thus characterized by a high focus on one orientation and a low focus on the other, and
therefore it appears in two quadrants of Figure 2. Domination does not mean that all of the conflicting
thoughts and feelings necessarily dissipate, only that the actor is able to choose one orientation—
positive or negative thoughts/feelings—over the other (Harrist 2006). Similar to avoidance, given the
apparent emphasis on defense mechanisms over coping mechanisms, domination is typically reactive
rather than proactive.
Response amplification (cf. reaction formation) is the primary nonconscious form of domination,
where one essentially exaggerates either the positive or negative orientation to the object so as to
override or “dominate” the other orientation and thereby relieve ambivalence (Baumeister et al.
1998, Bell and Esses 2002, Katz and Glass 1979). For example, ombudspersons handle the
organizational ambivalence of (1) advocating for the best interests of employees who file complaints
while (2) maintaining the status quo of organizational operations. Ombudspersons studied by Kolb
(1987) tended to embrace one set of norms or the other, resolving the ambivalence by being either a
“helping” ombudsperson or a “fact-finding” ombudsperson. It is important to note that domination via
response amplification does not necessarily mean that the actor has permanently erased the opposite
pole; rather, it may persist nonconsciously (Kets de Vries and Miller 1984).
Response amplification may also be part of a nonconscious macro-oscillation that occurs over time,
representing a shift from one domination cell in Figure 2 to the opposite domination cell, such that one
experiences an entire paradigm shift. Kets de Vries and Miller (1984) provide an example. An artistic
director and an administrative director of an opera company seemed to be inseparable, never differed
in opinions, and consistently presented a united front in board meetings. This zealous relationship
persisted for two years, until the administrative director violated the authority of the artistic director.
Despite the interdependence of their roles, the two men quit interacting, and the artistic director
vilified his colleague until the board fired him. The authors suggest that the relationship between the
executives was not perfect prior to the falling out, implying some ambivalence toward the relationship.
However, the negative feelings were forcefully held in abeyance, eventually gaining enough
momentum to shift the ostensibly positive relationship to its opposite. The change from extremely
positive to extremely negative represents a paradigm shift around the fulcrum of ambivalence. As the
saying goes, there is often a thin line between love and hate.
Intense ambivalence may also lead to conscious domination processes—that is, to coping mechanisms.
Having acknowledged both orientations prior to making a decision, conscious domination appears to
be a way of ignoring the importance of one orientation rather than ignoring its existence. Conscious

domination can be as simple as actively deciding to commit to one extreme and dismiss the other, if
only for the sake of relieving discomfort. For instance, Bridge and Baxter (1992) note the oppositional
norms involved when one is both a supervisor and a friend toward the same individual, including
impartiality versus favoritism, evaluation versus acceptance, and confidentiality versus openness. A
supervisor may cope with the resulting ambivalence by privileging one role over the other. A
supervisor interviewed by Zorn (1995, p. 136) stated, “What Sally and I would always do is I’d say ‘All
right, I’m talking to you Sally-friend not Sally-supervisor.’ ” An example at the collective level of analysis
is provided by Tracy’s (2004, p. 125) study of a correctional facility, where the norms “create ongoing
ambivalence—between kindness and control, flexibility and rigidity, solidarity and autonomy.” As a
result, the facility’s leaders encouraged officers to manage their ambivalence by downplaying some
dimensions (e.g., kindness) and emphasizing others (e.g., control).
Research indicates that ambivalence may prompt information processing that is biased toward
whatever orientation is initially stronger or more salient (Clark et al. 2008, van Harreveld et al. 2009a).
Thus, although domination is expedient, it may short-circuit detailed consideration of the foregone
orientation. Indeed, research suggests that ambivalent attitudes are more susceptible than
nonambivalent attitudes to a variety of (often specious) primes, including mood, recent cues about the
object, and consensus information (i.e., what others think) (Bell and Esses 1997, Hass et al.
1991, Hodson et al. 2001). It is as if the actor is looking for a way out, however specious the reasoning.
Furthermore, it seems likely that conscious domination is very prone to rationalization because the
actor may need a reassuring justification to bolster the choice (cf. neutralization theory; see Sykes and
Matza 1957)—particularly if the actor is accountable to others (Tetlock 1985). Through rationalization,
actors can convince themselves that one orientation is superior to the other or trivialize an orientation
until the favored one can be enacted with greater ease (van Harreveld et al. 2009b). We acknowledge
that domination is not the only process in Figure 2 where there may be a felt need to rationalize, but
the need here appears particularly acute. In a study of “necessary evils” (i.e., tasks that cause harm to
others to serve a greater purpose), Margolis and Molinsky (2008) observed the behaviors of
ambivalent employees, such as police officers tasked with evicting tenants from their homes. Faced
with the tension between what they considered as irreconcilable opposites—the obligation to do their
job and the aversion toward causing hardship for those who could not pay their bills—some officers
disengaged from the tenants, rationalizing the need for evictions (e.g., “Well, they [the evictees] put
themselves in this situation. And what about the landlord…?”; p. 856).
Positive and Negative Outcomes
We argue that, in general, domination is most effective under one or more of the following conditions.
The first is when the core of both the positive and negative orientations does not need to be preserved
(e.g., having two equally desirable but mutually exclusive potential locations for a new plant, which
creates ambivalence toward each alternative). In this case, decisive action is appropriate as it enables
actors to relieve the intense ambivalence and align their thoughts and feelings with their behavior. The
second condition is when the actor must choose between mutually exclusive orientations (e.g., hiring
or not hiring a candidate for which there are mixed feelings)—and that is precisely when ambivalence
becomes particularly intense (van Harreveld et al. 2009b). The third condition is when one orientation
is actually counterproductive. For example, intense ambivalence could be caused by a need to

complete a work-related project coupled with a fear of failure. Focusing on task completion while
neutralizing the fear would provide an effective response to the ambivalence. That said, the rejected
orientation may rear its head in unexpected ways (even when chased out of conscious awareness);
as Lewis (2000, p. 763) notes, rejecting “one side of a polarity intensifies pressure from the other.” The
final condition is when, as with avoidance, the actor has low discretion or agency and is thus less able
to forge a more integrative response, if desired.
Conversely, domination can be very dysfunctional in situations that require maintenance of both
orientations. For instance, tension in the mission of a natural food cooperative required the
simultaneous enactment of pragmatic business values and idealistic values that set the co-op apart
from other grocers (Ashforth and Reingen 2014). To stay afloat, neither the pragmatic nor idealistic
values could dominate over time. Domination would be a dysfunctional response that either destroys
the co-op’s mission (if pragmatic values prevail) or bankrupts the co-op (if idealistic values prevail).
Additionally, domination may be dysfunctional when the decision is biased toward whatever
orientation is initially stronger or salient, as noted above, or the decision is based solely on relieving
discomfort. Gray (1999) suggests that choices made under negative emotional states are often biased
toward the alternative that will cause the least discomfort at the time. Taking the path of least
resistance may seem desirable in the moment but has negative long-term consequences, particularly if
the relative benefits of the chosen response are artificially exaggerated through response
amplification.
Because domination tends to be signified by decisive action (choosing one orientation over the other),
other actors who are unaware of the issue prompting the ambivalence are likely to draw positive
conclusions (e.g., “she provides clear direction”). However, where other actors are aware of the issue
and see merit in both orientations, this positive conclusion is likely to be tempered and perhaps even
reversed by concerns over the focal actor’s judgment (e.g., “she’s overly simplistic in her thinking”).
This tempering or reversal is very significant because it suggests that what appears quite positive to the
uninformed appears quite the opposite to those who better understand the situation.

Compromise
Nature of the Response
Compromise is associated with a moderate focus on both the positive and negative orientations
(see Figure 2). Compromise involves reciprocal concessions between the opposing orientations such
that they are mutually accommodated. It can be characterized as a coping mechanism in that it is
typically a conscious and intentional process, whereby one acknowledges the simultaneous existence
of the orientations and recognizes the desirability of partially honoring each. In this way,
compromise—especially the form we refer to below as “black and white”—is more akin to “problemfocused coping” than “emotion-focused” as the focus is on responding to ambivalence by dealing with
the cause rather than regulating the associated tension (Lazarus and Folkman 1984). Thus, although
compromise can be either proactive or reactive, it tends to be more proactive than avoidance or
domination.
As a discrete action, compromise can take one of two forms. First, actors can “average” or combine the
black and white into gray such that a middle ground is found that is not really true to either black or
white. Such “gray compromises” are common and diverse in organizations; two examples will suffice.

For one, individuals experiencing ambivalence about a task may self-handicap when they want to
succeed but doubt their capability. Self-handicapping enables one to externalize failure by deliberately
acting in ways that inhibit performance (Berglas and Jones 1978). An employee preparing for a
presentation may procrastinate, making it impossible to prepare thoroughly. By telling coworkers that
she prepared the slides just minutes before the meeting, she has an excuse if the presentation does
not go well. Ambivalence was thus reduced by neither completing the task as well as possible (black)
nor delegating the task to a coworker (white). As another example, Weick (1979) explains a fire
captain’s choices in responding to a call from an area noted for false alarms. If the captain
compromises by sending all the firefighters, but at a slower speed than usual, the response is
inappropriate whether there is a fire or not. If there is a fire, the firefighters will not arrive soon
enough; if there is not a fire, all the resources have been needlessly sent to the false alarm. As these
examples illustrate, gray compromises tend to be problematic when at least the core of each
orientation needs to be preserved.
A second type of compromise is where neither orientation is sacrificed, nor are the orientations wholly
honored to the point where they are incompatible. This can be termed a “black and white
compromise.” To illustrate, the fire captain can act as if there is a fire and as if there is not by very
promptly sending only some crew members. If there is a fire, the crew has arrived as quickly as
possible; if there is not a fire, all of the resources were not wasted (Weick 1979). As this example
illustrates, the actor simultaneously respects the core of each orientation, albeit in a give-and-take
form. Black and white compromise may also occur sequentially in the form of vacillation, where the
actor alternates orientations based on the situation (Pratt and Doucet 2000, Tracy 2004). These shortterm fluctuations differ from the macro-oscillation discussed under “domination,” where one
experiences an entire paradigm shift. The short-term fluctuations, considered as a set, respect both
orientations, even if each alternation seems to abandon one orientation for the other. Pratt and
Dutton (2000, p. 117) found that librarians were ambivalent about homeless people in their library,
feeling “compassion, sympathy, and empathy as well as anger, fear, and disgust.” The library’s director
gave money to homeless patrons at times and asked them to leave at other times; one librarian would
sometimes call social services to request help for the homeless and sometimes call the police to
remove them from the library. As an example at the collective level, Wells (1988) notes that the staff at
a Girl Scout camp experienced ambivalence because they identified with the organization but were put
off by the wholesomeness of the Girl Scout identity. As a result, when working in public they strove to
display a professional image, but behind closed doors they distanced themselves from that identity by
resorting to humor and derision about the Girl Scout symbols. We posit that it is precisely because the
librarians and Girl Scout staff opted for a negative orientation at one point that they were able to opt
for a positive orientation at a later point, and vice versa (Ashforth and Mael 1998; see also Kosmala
and Herrbach 2006, Kunda 1992). In this case, long-term compromise was attained via short-term
vacillation.
Positive and Negative Outcomes
As suggested above, compromise is generally most effective when neither the positive nor negative
orientation alone is sufficient (gray or black and white compromise) or the core of each orientation
needs to be preserved (black and white compromise). However, opposites often do not lend
themselves readily to negotiation; thus the process of compromise may prove difficult and actual

resolutions may be hard to discern and enact. Compromise is therefore also more effective when the
actor has at least moderate discretion or agency. For example, some Benedictine sisters identified with
the Catholic Church but felt excluded by its male-dominated rituals, creating tension between feelings
of belonging and exclusion. In response to the resulting ambivalence toward the church, the sisters
chose to modify their practice of certain church-mandated rituals so that they were more inclusive of
women (Hoffman and Medlock-Klyukovski 2004).
As further noted, black and white compromise can also occur over time by vacillating between two
orientations. However, as Merton (1976, p. 105) puts it, “This delicate process of alternating phases is
a little like walking a tightrope, with all its attendant risks and successes.” If the core of black and/or
white matter and are lost, the compromise becomes dysfunctional.
To recognize a compromise, other actors must be aware of the issue that prompted the ambivalence.
Thus, actors who are unaware of the issue will have little reason to draw inferences about the focal
actor. Where other actors are aware of the issue, we posit that compromise is sufficiently normative in
organizational settings that they are likely to draw positive inferences (e.g., “the team is realistic”).
However, given organizational norms for consistency (Staw 1980), the vacillating form of compromise
may induce others to view the actor as inconsistent, indecisive, and perhaps even deliberately
hypocritical, particularly if the vacillation is prompted by nonconscious—and therefore difficult to
justify—impulses (cf. Rothman and Wiesenfeld 2007). Rothman and Wiesenfeld (2007) add that such
inferences may elicit frustration in others and inhibit liking and trust.

Holism
Nature of the Response
Unlike compromise, where the actor negates (gray) or diminishes (black and white) the integrity of
each orientation, or domination, where only one orientation is given expression, holism involves the
complete, simultaneous, and typically conscious acceptance of both opposing orientations.6 As such,
holism can usually be characterized as a coping mechanism. Holism is in the same spirit as black and
white compromise but represents less of a win–lose trade-off between the orientations and more of a
win–win embracing of both orientations. Accordingly, holism tends to be proactive and generally more
proactive than compromise.
The notion of holism raises the question: Given intense ambivalence, how can an actor consciously
retain it and thus “tolerate” it? The answer, we contend, is through the exercise of wisdom (Kessler
and Bailey 2007). Weick (1998, 2004) writes of an “attitude of wisdom” where actors balance
confidence with doubt, ready to act as if they know and yet as if they do not know. Cast in the
terminology of ambivalence, “knowing” and “doubting” are opposite orientations held simultaneously.
For example, an attitude of wisdom may involve treating “past experience as a guide as well as a trap”
(Weick 2004, p. 662). More generally, we view wisdom as the capacity, in part, to simultaneously
acknowledge and embrace opposing orientations, and thereby strive for a course of action that honors
both (cf. Clayton 1982, Martin 2009, Weick 1998). This suggests that holding onto the whole of
ambivalence may actually be functional. This view of wisdom shows the promise of ambivalence, but it
sheds little light on how wisdom facilitates a holistic response to ambivalence.

As with the other responses to ambivalence, we argue that holism can be enacted at both the
individual and collective level. However, because wisdom as a holistic response has received the least
attention in the literature relative to other responses, we address separately the individual responses
of “wise actors” and the collective responses of “wise systems.” Once delineated, we then show how
the two levels of responses may interact (bidirectional arrow 9 in Figure 1).
Individual responses of wise actors: How, specifically, do wise actors facilitate a holistic approach to
ambivalence? Building on our reading of the literature, we suggest three related ways: (1) mindfulness,
(2) “both/and” thinking, and (3) informed choice. Dane (2011, p. 1000; cf. Shapiro and Carlson
2009) defines mindfulness as “a state of consciousness in which attention is focused on presentmoment phenomena occurring both externally and internally.” Fiol et al. (2009, p. 44) add that
“[m]indfulness results from a reluctance to simplify”—a willingness to embrace complexity. Most
important for our purposes, Fiol et al. (2009, p. 44) further note that “[m]indfulness has three key
characteristics: (1) the creation of new categories of meaning, (2) openness to new information, and
(3) an implicit awareness of multiple perspectives.” We noted that holism tends to be the most
proactive of the responses to ambivalence. A mindful actor is more likely to be actively aware of the
external and/or internal stimuli that have fostered or made salient opposing orientations along with
the experience of the ambivalence itself. For example, through a series of experiments, Rees et al.
(2013, p. 367) found that emotional ambivalence increased accuracy in various judgments by
increasing participants’ receptivity to others’ perspectives, concluding that emotional ambivalence can
produce a “wise mind.” Mindfulness facilitates both/and thinking, described in detail below, by making
the issue conscious or at least attuning actors to what may otherwise remain nonconscious (Dane
2011) and by inhibiting the often reflexive narrowing of attention (Fiol and O’Connor 2003, Weick and
Putnam 2006) that is the hallmark of domination. In addition, mindfulness may facilitate actions that
address the negatively viewed aspects of the object in question so that the opposing orientations are
better able to be meshed. Meyerson (2001) describes a senior vice president of a financial firm who
was ambivalent about the privileges of office, enjoying her own but perceiving that the distribution of
the privileges was unfair to other women and minorities. Unlike other, presumably less mindful,
executives, she responded to the entreaties of working parents by offering more flexible work
arrangements to accommodate their family obligations, and the firm eventually institutionalized such
arrangements. Consistent with the awareness enabled by mindfulness, Meyerson describes various
behaviors through which actors may approach ambivalence holistically, from “turning personal threats
into opportunities” to “leveraging small wins” to “organizing collective action” (p. 8).
The second way that wisdom facilitates a holistic approach to ambivalence is through both/and rather
than either/or thinking. Either/or thinking refers to a tendency to separate the orientations, creating a
dichotomy (e.g., a selection committee glorifies a job candidate for the high depth of her industry
experience or demonizes the candidate for the low breadth of her experience across industries),
whereas both/and thinking refers to a tendency to juxtapose the orientations, potentially resulting in
perceived complementarity and even synergy (e.g., the committee recognizes that the low breadth
made the high depth possible; see, e.g., Cameron et al. 2006, Chen 2002, Jubas and Butterwick 2008).
Both/and thinking involves developing a more comprehensive understanding of the opposition at the
heart of ambivalence—a synthesis of sorts of the “thesis/antithesis” that the opposition represents, a
transcendence of the particulars. However, in holism the thesis and antithesis do not disappear; holism

thus enables the actor to appreciate that the aspects of the object that engender the opposing
orientations are integral to the object and perhaps even desirable (cf. Lewis 2000; cf. Janusian
thinking, Rothenberg 1979). For example, the literature on organizational ambidexterity suggests that
when actors embrace the apparent contradiction between the need for exploration and the need for
exploitation—and the resulting ambivalence toward each—more nuanced and jointly optimizing
actions can result (e.g., Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008, Smith and Tushman 2005). As F. Scott Fitzgerald
(1945, p. 69) famously stated,
The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the
same time, and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that
things are hopeless and yet be determined to make them otherwise.
Research suggests that ambivalence motivates heightened information processing (Jonas et al.
1997, Maio et al. 2001). Through both/and thinking, the actor recognizes the integrity underlying the
aspects of the object that give rise to ambivalence. That is, the actor may respond to the whole object,
not just to its favored aspects (as in domination). Furthermore, the actor does so in a manner that
honors that integrity, rather than betrays animus toward its constituent parts. Plambeck and Weber
(2010, p. 694) find that CEOs who were the most ambivalent about the enlargement of the European
Union engaged in “strategic ambidexterity,” where the orientation of their firms was simultaneously
offensive and defensive, increasing the spectrum of information considered in strategic actions (see
also Tang et al. 2010). Similarly, Lüscher and Lewis (2008) describe an intervention for production
managers at Lego Company in the wake of a major restructuring from a traditional hierarchy to selfmanaging teams. Rather than be paralyzed by the resulting dilemmas that invited ambivalence (e.g.,
empowering teams versus controlling them), managers were encouraged to embrace the dilemmas
and forgo simplistic either/or thinking in favor of both/and thinking. Lüscher and Lewis conclude, “Such
awareness was empowering, reducing tendencies to blame executives [for sending mixed messages]
and shifting responsibility to the managers to find means of living with tensions” (p. 234).
As these examples suggest, both/and thinking in the context of holism does not mean that the
negative orientation is necessarily converted into a positive orientation, only that the actor is able to
make sense of the object in such a way that the totality of the object and the ambivalence it spawns is
accepted and perhaps even prized. This also does not mean that the discomfort that attends
ambivalence is necessarily reduced, given that the opposing orientations are actively sustained. Rather,
it speaks to the actor coming to terms with the experience of ambivalence. To illustrate, Wright
(2009) describes the ambivalent organizational identification of internal organizational consultants.
The consultants simultaneously felt both attached as employees of the organization and detached as
objective evaluators of the organization. Some came to regard their unique position of being
“outsiders within” as a “positive source of strength and distinctiveness” (p. 319).
The third way that wisdom facilitates holism is through informed choice. Research on commitment
(Brickman 1987, Pratt and Rosa 2003) and trust (Pratt and Dirks 2006) illustrates holism as a choice
made by wise actors. Brickman (1987) suggests that commitment is the “antidote” to ambivalence.
How he views commitment, however, is much different from behavioral/escalation approaches
(Salancik 1977) or attitudinal approaches to commitment (see Pratt and Rosa 2003). In Brickman’s
view, actors must first know the positive and negative “elements” (p. 7) associated with forming an

attachment to a person, idea, or other object. These positive and negative elements are not divisible
from the object. Pratt and Rosa (2003, p. 395), for instance, describe how network marketing firms
“harvest” work–family conflict to transform individuals’ emotional ambivalence about the firm into
commitment. They deliberately recruit individuals who are at risk for work–family conflict and
encourage them to frame work in terms of helping their family (e.g., “you’re doing this for your
children”), to recruit their own family and friends to help with bookkeeping and distribution, and to
avoid those who would “steal their dreams” (p. 411). For Brickman, commitment involves the binding
of the positive (helping one’s family) and negative (sacrifice) elements through choosing a course of
action. Indeed, Pratt and Rosa report that newcomers experiencing little emotional ambivalence
ultimately had weak commitment to the organization. Pratt and Dirks (2006) make a similar argument
about ambivalence and choice when discussing the concept of trust in organizations. Trust involves
being vulnerable so as to achieve something positive in a relationship in the future (Rousseau et al.
1998). They suggest that trust involves choosing both a positive (future reward) and negative
(vulnerability) element simultaneously.
To be sure, sometimes the negative elements will be more salient (similar to “being committed” to an
asylum) while at other times the positive elements will be more salient. But at its core, both positive
and negative elements always remain. Thus, commitment as a holistic action differs from compromise
or domination where one orientation is diluted or discarded. Furthermore, by choosing to accept the
opposition, the actor transforms what may have been outside his or her control—such as opposing
norms—into something that is experienced as more controllable (Harrist 2006, Meyerson 2001). In
short, an actor may not choose to be exposed to ambivalence but can choose how to respond to it—to
accept that ambivalence as an essential element for commitment or trust. For instance, Ashcraft
(2001) describes the “organized dissonance” of a feminist bureaucracy that assisted victims of
domestic violence. Faced with ambivalence about relying on a traditional hierarchy (hierarchy both
facilitates and impedes the mission), members opted to embrace the ambivalence and utilize a
hierarchy in a nontraditional manner with informal, egalitarian practices (e.g., consensual decision
making, eschewing heavy-handed supervision).
Collective responses via wise systems: A wise system is a set of practices, as embodied in informal (e.g.,
culture) and formal structure, for actively embracing and honoring positive and negative orientations
toward an object. Wise systems keep ambivalence in play. Under both/and thinking, we
quoted Lüscher and Lewis (2008, p. 234) that wise actors “find means of living with tensions.” Similarly,
a wise system connects opposing orientations in a more or less ongoing manner to keep alive “creative
tension” (Cameron 1986, p. 549) and thus the potential to honor the orientations in adaptive and novel
ways as emerging circumstances warrant. Research on organized dissonance (Ashcraft 2001),
organizational ambidexterity (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008), organizational dualities (Ashforth and
Reingen 2014), and organizational mindfulness (Farjoun 2010) provide examples of how organizations
may eschew one-time responses to ambivalence in favor of an ongoing juxtaposition of the
orientations fueling ambivalence. For example, Ashcraft (2001, p. 1315) writes of the need for periodic
“group reflection as a safety valve that keeps contradiction alive.”
Culture refers to a set of values, beliefs, norms, and assumptions that typify an organization or subunit
(cf. Schein 2010). A culture conducive to holism is one that privileges certain values (e.g., openness,

inquiry), beliefs (e.g., progress results from a full airing of both sides of an issue, the complexity of the
decision making process should reflect the complexity of the issue), norms (e.g., encourage wide
participation, have second-chance meetings to reconsider decisions), and assumptions (e.g.,
ambivalence is normal, reasonable group members can disagree). For instance, we
mentioned Ashforth and Reingen’s (2014) study of a natural food cooperative, where ambivalence
over business values and idealistic values was kept simmering. Numerous meetings were held to allow
discussions of ambivalence-provoking issues, and certain rituals (e.g., appeals to collective interest,
apologies for rudeness) helped regulate the resulting conflicts. Members described their decisionmaking process as decidedly “messy,” a term that we speculate generally describes wise systems.
Structure refers to the design of the organization or subunit. Wise systems appear to facilitate holism
through either differentiation (complemented with integration; cf. Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) or
nondifferentiation. We noted earlier that organizations frequently embody hybrid identities and
pursue contradictory goals, prompting ambivalence toward any one identity or goal. In differentiation,
these identities and goals are assigned to (or emerge within) separate actors. For example, Raisch and
Birkinshaw’s (2008) review of the literature on organizational ambidexterity suggests that one way
organizations address the efficiency–innovation trade-off, and the ambivalence it triggers toward each,
is by assigning each to separate subunits. Differentiation thus allows each subunit to pursue a
particular goal, devoid of ambivalence. Similarly, a group may designate a specific member to play the
role of devil’s advocate and represent the misgivings of other group members, thereby releasing the
other members from the burden of mixed feelings (Smith and Berg 1987). As Lawrence and Lorsch
(1967) argue, differentiation creates a need for integration to then reknit the actors together so that
the collective can move forward as a more or less unitary body. Thus, differentiated organizations tend
to create integration mechanisms, such as having senior management provide strategic integration of
the efficiency- and innovation-oriented subunits (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008) or having a matrix
structure that intentionally juxtaposes a functional focus with a product focus (Galbraith 2009). In
terms of ambivalence, then, differentiation and integration facilitate a holistic approach by fostering an
ongoing creative tension between the identities/goals. In these examples, the underlying cause of
ambivalence at one level is “resolved” by activities at another level; indeed, what appears to be
domination at the lower level (e.g., within a given subunit) may help foster holism at the higher level.
In nondifferentiation, the identities/goals are jointly allocated to subunits or individuals so that actors
must each struggle with the oppositions and hence the ambivalence toward any given identity or goal.
As such, structures predicated on nondifferentiation tend to be less complex than those predicated on
differentiation and integration. An example is for-profit hospitals where the medical staff is expected
to jointly weigh the sometimes oppositional goals of patient service and cost considerations (Shore
1998). Note, however, that the structure per se does not actually facilitate actors’ responses to
ambivalence; it simply makes ambivalence that much more intense and salient. Thus, to qualify as a
holistic approach, nondifferentiation must be complemented with the other aspects of a wise system.
Wise actors ↔ wise systems: The notions of wise actors at the individual level and wise systems at the
collective level raise the question of how wisdom may play out across levels of analysis. What wise
actors do may ultimately become institutionalized in the culture and structure of the wider
organization. Wise actors, in short, can give rise to wise systems (arrow 9 in the upward direction

in Figure 1; see Bierly and Kolodinsky 2007, Bierly et al. 2000). Martin (2009) describes how a sharp
increase in research and development spending at Procter & Gamble (P&G) led to disappointing results
and thus to ambivalence about the desirability of such spending (is it a good investment or a bad
investment?). Helping to fuel the negative orientation to research and development spending was a
belief among some senior executives that P&G was primarily a marketing company. CEO A. G. Lafley
facilitated an effective approach dubbed “Connect & Develop,” which derived synergies from the
positive and negative orientations, thereby “reconciling the irreconcilable” (p. 58). Specifically, Lafley
set a goal that 50% of P&G’s innovations come from outside the firm, with P&G leveraging those
innovations through its marketing and distribution muscle, thereby institutionalizing his own wisdom.
By the same token, wise systems can promote and reinforce the wisdom of individuals. In short, wise
systems can give rise to wise actors (arrow 9 in the downward direction in Figure 1).
Following Sternberg (1998; cf. Bigelow 1992), wisdom is acquired by gaining tacit knowledge over time
and is best developed through dialectical processes; clearly, the more ambivalent experiences actors
have, the more opportunities they have to wrestle with such processes (in the form of oppositional
tendencies). This suggests that a wise system, where ambivalence is actively kept alive, may provide
the seedbed for actors to become wise(r). For instance, Plambeck and Weber (2010) found that
organizational characteristics that supply and facilitate diverse perspectives on a given issue, such as
ambidextrous strategies and the functional diversity of the top management team, were more likely to
have CEOs who reported ambivalence toward strategic issues. Although it is not clear what is cause
and what is effect here, wise actors and wise systems can reinforce each other.
Even though wisdom appears far more likely to result from a combination of wise actors in wise
systems, our interpretation of examples of ambivalence in the literature suggests that it is possible for
wisdom to result from wise actors working within an “unwise” system or from “unwise” actors working
within a wise system. In short, the wisdom of the actors or of the system can compensate for its
absence in the other. Whereas the popular press has many stories of heroic and often wise innovators,
whistleblowers, and leaders salvaging faulty organizations, the notion of unwise actors in a wise
system is less obvious. In Ashforth and Reingen’s (2014) study of a natural food co-op, advocates of the
business values and advocates of the idealistic values tended to stubbornly deny and resist the views of
their opponents. The authors liken the dynamics to the oppositional politics of Democrats and
Republicans in the American political system (cf. Maybury-Lewis and Almagor 1989). In the co-op,
wisdom was not a function of the actors but of the system that forcibly juxtaposed their views. Thus,
as Bierly et al. (2000, p. 597) note, “[O]rganizations can act wisely even though it may not be possible
to ascribe wisdom to any individual actor within the organization.”
Can unwise actors in unwise systems nonetheless enact holism in response to ambivalence? It seems
very unlikely. Given that wisdom is in part the capacity to simultaneously acknowledge and embrace
oppositional orientations, it is difficult to see how an unwise actor in an unwise system would have the
wherewithal to truly engage such orientations. That said, unwise actors in an unwise system may
nonetheless be induced to attempt the processes that typify wisdom, as when external consultants try
to restore an organization’s health (e.g., Lüscher and Lewis 2008), or may, through trial and error,
discover such processes. Thus, unwise actors in an unwise system need not be a permanent condition.

In sum, wise actors and wise systems are mutually reinforcing, as a holistic approach to ambivalence
reinforces and further develops wisdom.
Positive and Negative Outcomes
The discussion above suggests that holism is generally most effective when the full integrity of both
orientations needs to be preserved, coupled with an actor who has sufficient discretion or agency—or
a system with sufficient resources—to enact both the demanding process and the (typically) complex
“resolution” of the underlying causes of the ambivalence. But how can individuals or collectives know
when the full integrity of opposing orientations needs to be preserved? They may have to engage in
holistic processes to even discern whether there is indeed an integrity that should and can be honored;
therefore holism represents something of a leap of faith. That said, the desirability of full integrity is
likely to be signaled before the fact by (1) the issue’s apparent significance (e.g., an issue that deeply
affects an actor’s goals and functions, a persistent or recurring issue, an issue with key stakeholders
aligned with each orientation) and (2) potential synergies that may be realized from simultaneously
holding or even integrating the orientations (e.g., perceiving an opportunity to learn and innovate,
recognizing that the positive orientation needs to be tempered by the concerns fueling the negative
orientation) (cf. Martin 2009, Thomas 1992).
Our discussion above also suggests the following positive outcomes of holism: (1) neither orientation is
diminished; (2) growth in the actor’s understanding and appreciation of the object, fostering
commitment to and trust in the object; (3) adaptability, that is, retaining the capacity to act in multiple
and seemingly inconsistent ways, depending on the situation; and (4) acting as a change agent, that is,
mindfully nudging the object (or system) in positive ways even while expressing the actor’s belief in the
integrity of the object. However, a problematic feature of holism is that the requisite wisdom is very
difficult to cultivate and sustain, and it is often unclear what specific behaviors should flow from
wisdom in any event. Not surprisingly, then, Weick (1998) acknowledges that the pursuit of an attitude
of wisdom—ambivalence that tempers knowing with doubting—can undermine confidence and impair
action (see also Pratt and Pradies 2011). Furthermore, by actively keeping both orientations alive,
holism may not relieve the discomfort that attends ambivalence.
Finally, as with compromise, to recognize a holistic response, other actors must be aware of the issue
that prompted the ambivalence. As noted, observers expect consistency and decisiveness from actors
rather than expressions of ambivalence (Rothman and Wiesenfeld 2007). Thus, as with the vacillating
form of black and white compromise, holism may result in behaviors that appear to others to be
inconsistent in the short term—even if, when considered as a series over time, they are actually quite
nuanced and respect the totality of the object. In short, because the effectiveness of holism is often
only revealed over time, holism may lead to the actor being perceived as indecisive, inconsistent, or
hypocritical, at least in the short term. For example, Cha and Edmondson (2006) studied a company
whose CEO espoused employees’ best interests and being a family as key values. When the company
more than doubled in size over three years, employees made hypocritical attributions about the CEO’s
actions, viewing this growth as threatening their best interests (e.g., loss of camaraderie). However, in
an interview with the authors, the CEO said he actually viewed growth, in part, as a vehicle for
employee development and wage growth. This cautionary tale implies that the negative attributions

arising from seemingly inconsistent actions can be mitigated and even reversed if the actor is able to
clearly articulate a compelling need for holism.
To summarize, Figure 2 depicts a conceptual framework for organizing actors’ responses to
ambivalence in organizational settings and underscores that each response is associated with certain
trade-offs that may make it, depending on the situation, functional or dysfunctional. The main
arguments are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3 Actor Responses to Ambivalence: Description, Examples, Outcomes, and Conditions
Description

Examples

Avoidance
• The nonconscious and/or
conscious evasion of the
ambivalence caused by
the opposing
orientations.
• Typically reactive rather
than proactive.
•

•

Nurses who smoked
were ambivalent about
their responsibility for
advising patients against
smoking. When a need
for such advice appeared
low, some nurses tended
to avoid advising
patients against smoking
(Radsma and Bottorff
2009).
Tracy (2004) found that
correctional facilities
propounded
contradictory
organizational norms
regarding the behavior
of officers toward
inmates (e.g., nurture
versus discipline).
However, the facilities’
cultures made the
complex tensions seem
straightforward and
strongly discouraged
officers from asking
questions, thereby
promoting avoidance of
the resulting
ambivalence.

Domination
• The nonconscious and/or
conscious bolstering of one
orientation so that it
overwhelms the other.
• Typically reactive rather than
proactive.
•

•

Arribas-Ayllon et al.
(2009) discuss the
ambivalence felt among
professionals involved in
genetic counseling who could
see the benefits but also
sensed moral danger in the
practice. In response to
parents seeking a genetic test
for their child without
considering the ethical
implications, the
professionals alleviated their
ambivalence by citing
“extreme case scenarios” (p.
183) that painted the parents
as unreasonable.
Bowles (1991),
interpreting Kriegler (1980),
describes the ambivalence
that a group of shipyard
managers felt from inflicting
terrible work conditions on
workers with whom they
empathized. To reconcile the
demeaning work they
demanded of good people,
the managers demeaned the
workers, allowing the

Compromise
• A typically conscious
give-and-take between
the opposing
orientations
— Gray compromise
— Black and white
compromise.
• Proactive or reactive.
• Librarians felt
humanistic concern
toward homeless
individuals who
occupied their library
but also felt
responsible for
eliminating disruptions
to patrons. In response
to the resulting
ambivalence, librarians
vacillated in their
behavior (e.g., at times
calling police to
remove the homeless,
at other times calling
social agencies to
provide help) (Pratt
and Dutton 2000).
• Strategic alliances
involve certain
dialectical tensions
(e.g., cooperation–
competition) that are
likely to provoke
ambivalence (e.g., we
should cooperate and
not cooperate).
Accordingly, strategic
alliances may opt for

Holism
• The simultaneous and
typically conscious
acceptance of both
opposing orientations.
• Typically proactive rather
than reactive.
•

•

Internal organizational
consultants felt ambivalent
because they
simultaneously felt
attached as insiders of the
organization and detached
as objective
evaluators. Wright (2009, p.
319) found that some
consultants viewed their
unique position of being
both “insiders” (employees)
and “outsiders” (roving
consultants) as a “positive
source of strength and
distinctiveness.”
A natural food cooperative
experienced tension
between its idealistic values
(which supported the
organization’s mission) and
its business values (which
kept the organization
financially sound). The
organization kept the
resulting ambivalence in
play by meetings that tacitly
surfaced the tension,
complemented with certain
rituals that helped regulate

managers to see both the
work and workers negatively.

Outcomes:
Positive

•

Reduces tension to a
more tolerable level,
enabling performance
and the other responses
to ambivalence.

•

•

Alleviates tension, aligns
thoughts and feelings with
behavior.
May lead to positive (e.g.,
decisive, clear) attributions
by other actors who are
unaware of the issue
prompting ambivalence.

“balancing” the
opposing tensions (Das
and Teng 2000, p. 84).
•
•

Maintains each
orientation.
May lead to positive
(e.g., realistic,
practical) attributions
by other actors who
are aware of the issue
prompting
ambivalence.

•

•
•
•
•

Outcomes:
Negative

•

•

•

Conditions
under
which it is
most
effective

•
•

May prevent recognition
of ambivalence,
inhibiting learning and
problem solving.
May prove futile; may
backfire and render
ambivalence more
salient.
May lead to negative
attributions by other
actors if the issue is
regarded as important.

•

Immediate action is not
required.
The actor has low
discretion or agency.

•

•

•

Sacrifices integrity of both
orientations.
May be biased toward
whatever orientation is
initially stronger or more
salient, or is the least
uncomfortable, rather than
the most effective.
May lead to negative (e.g.,
simplistic, reckless)
attribtuions by other actors
who are aware of the issue
and see merit in both
orientations.
The core of both orientations
does not need to be
preserved.

•

•

•

May be difficult to
implement the
process, and the
outcomes may be
elusive.
May lead to negative
(e.g., inconsistent,
hypocritical)
attributions about
vacillation by other
actors, absent
awareness of the issue
prompting
ambivalence.
Neither orientation
alone is sufficient (gray
or black and white
compromise), or the
core of both

•

•
•
•

•
•

the resulting conflicts (e.g.,
appeals to collective
interest, apologies for
rudeness) (Ashforth and
Reingen 2014).
Causes both orientations to
be fully embraced,
facilitating growth in
understanding and
appreciation of the object
as well as commitment to
the object.
Facilitates adaptability.
Enables acting as a change
agent.
Reinforces wisdom.
May lead to positive (e.g.,
prudent) attributions by
other actors if the actor
articulates a compelling
need for holism.
May be difficult to cultivate
and sustain an attitude of
wisdom.
Is often unclear what
behaviors should result.
May not relieve discomfort.
May lead to negative (e.g.,
inconsistent, hypocritical)
attributions by other actors,
absent an articulated need.

The full integrity of both
orientations needs to be
preserved.
The actor has high
discretion or agency (or, in

•

•
•

The actor must choose
between mutually exclusive
orientations.
One orientation is actually
counterproductive.
The actor has low discretion
or agency.

•

orientations needs to
be preserved (black
and white
compromise).
The actor has at least
moderate discretion or
agency.

the case of wise systems,
the system has sufficient
resources).

Discussion

Ambivalence is defined as simultaneously positive and negative orientations toward an object. We
developed a multilevel perspective on ambivalence in organizations that demonstrates how this
phenomenon is integral to cognitive/emotional processes and important outcomes. Specifically, we
argued that ambivalence results from oppositions (a demand for A and not-A) manifested in
organizational contexts as hybrid identities, contradictory goals, role conflicts; dualities; multifaceted
objects; and temporal factors. As displayed in Figure 1, these oppositions can trigger ambivalence at
the individual level or collective level of analysis, which may diffuse to the other level through cognitive
(sensemaking, sensegiving) and emotional (emotional contagion, emotions-as-socialinformation/emotional comparison) processes and prompt responses at each level (i.e., avoidance,
domination, compromise, holism).
Although previous research has identified various defense and coping mechanisms for responding to
ambivalence, it focused on a limited set of the potential responses and lacked a conceptual framework
for organizing these responses. Crossing two dimensions—a focus on the positive orientation toward
the object in question and a focus on the negative orientation—enabled us to organize the betterknown responses under the labels of avoidance (the focus on each is low), compromise (each is
moderate), and domination (one is low and one is high) and to identify an intriguing but little-known
response that we dubbed holism (each orientation is high). We argued that each response is applicable
at the individual and collective levels of analysis and provided examples from the literature, although
the original authors, of course, had not employed our framework. As summarized in Table 3, each
response has positive and negative outcomes and is most effective under certain conditions. However,
holism tends to be the most difficult to attain as it requires embracing both orientations
simultaneously, suggesting the need for wise actors and/or wise systems. An image of the ambivalent
and wise actor starkly contrasts with the popular image of an ambivalent actor as confused and
indecisive (i.e., weak; see Rothman and Wiesenfeld 2007).

Implications for Future Research

Our analysis suggests numerous possibilities for future research. We see the following five as
particularly important. First, we argued that the specific organizational triggers of ambivalence are
amenable to various responses, subject to the contingencies in Table 3 (see the “Conditions under
which it is most effective” row). Future research should explore this argument. For example, perhaps
certain triggers are more controllable by actors (e.g., hybrid identities versus a multifaceted job),
encouraging more proactive and substantive responses. Or perhaps stakeholders hold normative
expectations regarding the appropriate ways of addressing specific triggers, thereby limiting actors’
response repertoire. For instance, investors with a long-term stake in a corporation may have little
tolerance for the use of avoidance in the face of the change–continuity, global–local, or quality–
efficiency dualities.
Second, our discussion of the four responses did not distinguish between the individual and collective
levels of analysis. Indeed, each response has analogs at both levels of analysis, with the exception of
specific tactics such as structural differentiation and integration, which cannot be enacted at the
individual level. Importantly, though, it appears that ambivalence is easier to respond to (albeit not
necessarily more effectively) at the collective level than at the individual level because members of the

collective can help socially construct and sustain a reality that objective observers would disavow
(e.g., Choo 1996, Hardin and Higgins 1996). Prime examples include the avoidance responses of denial
and splitting (e.g., Smith and Berg 1987, Wexler 1993). Indeed, responses may become
institutionalized—even if they are not particularly effective—such that they become taken-for-granted
aspects of organizational life. Argyris (1985, 1990), for instance, writes of the reflexive defense
mechanisms in organizations that routinely block desirable change. Future research should determine
the applicability and boundary conditions of the various techniques for managing ambivalence at each
level of analysis.
Third, we identified holism as an intriguing but little-researched phenomenon. Future research should
focus on assessing and fleshing out our description of holism. In particular, we argued that wise actors
embrace opposing orientations toward an object via mindfulness, both/and thinking, and informed
choice. What synergies exist among these processes? What contextual factors are most conducive and
least conducive to each practice? Are there additional processes through which wisdom is enacted? To
what extent are holistic responses to ambivalence trainable and what specific practices might help
cultivate wisdom? For instance, we noted that wise systems may help foster wise actors by actively
keeping ambivalence alive and stimulating dialectical thinking. We described a wise system as a set of
practices embodied in culture and structure for embracing opposing orientations. Are there particular
sets of values, beliefs, norms, and assumptions that are necessary for a wise system, or is wisdom more
of a “fuzzy set” of cultural properties? Differentiation and nondifferentiation suggest diametrically
different structural approaches for institutionalizing wisdom; under what conditions is each approach
preferable? For example, because differentiation essentially removes the burden of ambivalence from
single actors (by distributing the opposing orientations across actors), it is likely more accommodating
of unwise actors than is nondifferentiation. Finally, we discussed how wise actors and wise systems are
mutually reinforcing. Future research might also explore means of fostering and sustaining the wisdom
of both actors and systems, such as through the institutionalization of external reviews, devil’s
advocates, and training in counterfactual thinking (cf. remedies for groupthink and escalation of
commitment; see, e.g., Ku 2008). Might it be possible to create reinforcing systems that create virtuous
cycles of wisdom?
Fourth, whereas we have treated the responses to ambivalence separately, future research should
examine how they relate to one another. For instance, we mentioned that avoidance may reduce
debilitating tension and thereby facilitate compromise and holism. Similarly, compromise may serve as
a fallback if holism fails. Although the responses appear to generally serve as substitutes (e.g.,
domination may obviate the need for holism), a given response may prove inadequate at rendering the
ambivalence less intense, thus provoking another response. In particular, one general response
trajectory may be to move “up the ladder” toward typically more conscious, proactive, and effortful
responses in the search for a resolution of the intense ambivalence; that is, avoidance → domination
→ gray compromise → black and white compromise → holism. For example, Gilbert (2006) discusses
how a newspaper organization initially framed the emergence of the Internet as an opportunity but, in
the face of setbacks, it responded to the presumable ambivalence by reframing it as a major threat
(domination). However, with continued experience, the organization came to see the Internet as both
an opportunity (for its online division) and a threat (for its print division), with the corporate level
providing the strategic integration (holism). Conversely, an actor may be overwhelmed by the tension

caused by a failed response; may dismiss more conscious, proactive, and effortful responses as
untenable; or may not even consider the possibility of such responses. In such cases, the actor may
move “down the ladder.” Future research exploring such trajectories will add a welcome dynamic
element to the model.
Finally, the integrative framework of responses to ambivalence may help shed new light on a variety of
organizational studies’ topics across levels of analysis, from decision making to motivation, groupthink
to group conflict, and organizational learning to organizational design. A prime example is leadership.
We noted earlier that leaders may express and thereby sow their ambivalence in the organization.
Although the literature typically regards this as quite dysfunctional (e.g., Larson and Tompkins
2005, Rothman and Wiesenfeld 2007), our analysis suggests that there are times when
leaders should actively sow ambivalence as a means of fostering personal growth, nuanced decision
making, adaptation, and creativity. Thus, perspectives on transformational leadership, spiritual
leadership, and servant leadership may be enriched by considering the potential role of ambivalence in
fomenting actor change. Furthermore, given that each of the four responses to ambivalence is most
effective under certain conditions, and that there are various ways that a given response can be
enacted, leaders can serve as potent role models for when and how to enact the responses. Finally,
leaders likely act as important conduits for institutionalizing responses to ambivalence in the culture
and structure of organizations. Our larger point, then, is that the model of responses to ambivalence
has the potential to inform a variety of traditional organizational topics in novel ways.

Conclusion

Far from indicating a rare and negative experience, ambivalence appears to be ubiquitous in
organizational settings and—although uncomfortable—ambivalence has the potential to help foster
growth and richly nuanced behavior. The discussion helps inform our understanding of how
organizational triggers foster ambivalence at the collective and individual levels of analysis, how
ambivalence diffuses across levels, and how actors are likely to respond to ambivalence and with what
positive and negative effects.
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Endnotes

1 Pratt and Pradies (2011), who are primarily interested in “positive” responses to ambivalence,
suggest that responses may vary in terms of their likelihood of leading to narrowed or
expanded avenues for future action. This shifts the basis of comparison to response potentials.

Because of our interest in understanding how responses relate to each other in terms of their
orientations toward the same target (rather than in the future responses they might engender),
we arrive at a very different way to organize responses.
2 Given that cognition and emotion are typically intertwined (Elfenbein 2007)—particularly in cases of
intense ambivalence—we will not explore differences between cognitive ambivalence and
emotional ambivalence (see Lavine et al. 1998 for a treatment of affective–cognitive
ambivalence; Conner and Armitage 2008 for attitudinal ambivalence, which combines cognition
and affect; and Rothman and Wiesenfeld 2007 for emotional ambivalence).
3 Building off work by Smith and Berg (1987) at the group level and Weick (2002) at a broader network
level, Pradies and Pratt (2010) argue that collectives can be conceptualized as ambivalent when
they are composed of actors who (1) are each ambivalent (holographic ambivalence) or (2) are
not ambivalent themselves but who hold thoughts or feelings that directly oppose those of
other actors such that the collective can be said to be ambivalent (ideographic ambivalence).
Because of our interest in a multilevel model, and because there is not a direct individual-level
correlate with ideographic ambivalence (which requires multiple actors), we will focus mainly
on holographic ambivalence.
4 Kozlowski and Klein (2000, p. 16) contrast composition effects with “compilation” effects—that is,
when members of the collective have divergent perspectives/experiences but, when juxtaposed
like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, form a meaningful pattern. Compilation effects are more relevant
to arrow 2 in Figure 1, as members of a collective socially construct a mutual understanding of a
given organizational trigger.
5 We recognize that for a given example of defense mechanisms and coping mechanisms it is often
impossible to know the degree to which the response was indeed nonconscious or conscious. In
the examples below, we are inferring the level of consciousness from the authors’ descriptions.
6 We say only “typically conscious” because holistic approaches may be the product of “unwise” actors
in a “wise” system (as explained below) or may, through repeated enactment, become at least
somewhat automatic.
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